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Abstract
This paper studies the application of leniency programs. An analysis of the structure
and design of leniency programs and existing literature raises a new question: Are leniency
programs eﬀective, in the sense that they deter cartels from formation, in asymmetrical
markets? A game theoretical model, which allows for asymmetry and predatory pricing, is
used to provide an answer. A leniency program does not always lead to a breach of trust. We
ﬁnd that, in certain industries, leniency programs are unable to break collusion. They may
have the adverse eﬀect in the sense that they strengthen cartel stability or may even lead
to abuse of market power. A relatively large ﬁrm can use coercion to remove the option to
a smaller ﬁrm to self-report to the authorities, thus removing the risk of prosecution posed
by the program. In industries characterized by a certain degree of asymmetry in market
shares and high sunk costs this is an even more likely scenario. In view of this limitation,
a number of policy implications are provided in the paper. Policies aimed at the removal of
the threat of retaliation need to be considered in order to convict and deter these kinds of
cartels.
JEL-Classiﬁcation: K21, L41
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1 Introduction
Leniency programs form a relatively new feature of antitrust law enforcement. Its main objective
is to remove trust between cartel members. Trust is an essential element of every conspiracy. A
similar approach to this kind of scheme is successfully employed in the prosecution of the maﬁa
(the so called ”witness protection program”) and by ﬁrms in their corporate whistle blowing
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1procedures. In practice, contact is established between a member of a conspiracy and the justice
department with a proposition to serve as a witness against its co-conspirators. As a reward the
witness receives (partial) amnesty from its own misconduct and protection from punishment
by the other members of the (former) crime syndicate. In the ’80’s and ’90’s of the previous
century the witness protection program proved to be a great success. Even though the trust
between (family) members of the maﬁa was relatively strong the program enabled the successful
conviction of a great number of criminals. No wonder a similar approach was adopted by the
antitrust authorities in the ﬁght against organized infringements of competition law. This paper
examines the consequences of the introduction and use of leniency programs in their attempt to
remove trust between cartel members. The emphasis of this paper is on leniency programs
and the prosecution of price-ﬁxing agreements, the reasoning can however also be applied
to corporate whistle blowing programs and witness protection programs. Several economists
have previously expressed their doubts on the application of the policy instrument in this new
(economic) setting. This paper attempts to address another issue that has been underestimated
in the design of leniency programs. An important element of the witness protection program
is to safeguard the witness from punishment by its former partners in crime. We show that,
using the realistic assumption of industry asymmetry, the current design of leniency programs
can’t prevent larger ﬁrms from using a threat of punishment as a means of coercion, eﬀectively
not allowing smaller ﬁrms to appeal for leniency. When the antitrust authority is unable to
credibly protect leniency applicants from retaliation by convicted cartel members the program
is abused by cartels. It actually serves to strengthen trust between its members. The program
has the adverse eﬀect in the sense that it facilitates organized violations of competition law.
Any type of leniency program should contain the following three elements. Firstly, the crim-
inal (or whistle-blower) provides suﬃcient evidence on the misconduct by its former partners
for the authorities to successfully prosecute and convict the other members (this is the ”wit-
ness” part). Secondly, the former criminal receives a, previously agreed on, lenient treatment.
This ranges between a reduction to a ﬁne, clemency from a prison sentence and a reward. A
discretionary approach makes sure the incentive is set according to the constraint faced by
the proposed witness and no resources are wasted. The third element is the protection from
punishment on the witness by its former conspirators. When all policy parameters of the three
elements are customized to ﬁt the typical case, the proposed witness accepts the oﬀer, the crime
syndicate is terminated and its members are convicted. Moreover, no resources are wasted and
an example is set for those ﬁrms or individuals considering the prospect to conspire. The degree
2of leniency for instance depends on the strength of trust in the criminal organization and the
degree of protection depends on the threat of punishment on the whistle-blower or self-reporter
by its former partners in crime. The mere existence of the scheme should act to prevent the
formation of trust and aims to remove the possibility to organize crime. Although some crimi-
nals receive amnesty for their wrong-doings, the approach, and especially the witness protection
program, is generally regarded highly eﬃcient in its aim to remove the detrimental eﬀects of
organized crime.
Leniency programs however are diﬀerent from witness protection programs where it concerns
the protection and the customization part of the program. As was said previously an important
aspect of the witness protection program is the protection from punishment by former partners
in crime. Another diﬀerence between the two is the aspect of customization of the parameters.
Both parts of the scheme have proven to be detrimental to the success of the witness protection
program. They have however been underestimated in the design of the program in its new
industrial context. It can be shown that, unless the necessity of the protection from punishment
is acknowledged by the authorities, cartels can strengthen their ties by means of the leniency
program. Customization of the program with respect to the size of the ﬁne and protection after
self-reporting can partially overcome this deﬁciency in the program. More general though,
the scheme will always need to be accompanied by an eﬀort of the competition authority in
traditional law enforcement.
A typical punishment strategy involves dumping or predatory pricing. Predatory pricing or
predation can be seen as a special form of limit pricing. This is the practice of inducing a rival
to exit a market or not to enter in the ﬁrst place. The practice is ﬁrst described by Bain (1949)
and was picked up later on by Milgrom and Roberts (1982). This type of punishment strategy is
diﬀerent from the practices considered in the conventional literature on collusion such as Motta
and Polo (2003) and Spagnolo (2004), since predatory pricing as a punishment strategy allows
for negative proﬁts. The credibility and impact of this type of punishment, through means of
a pricing strategy depends on the asymmetry in size between ﬁrms, such as the diﬀerence in
market share. Not only can a ”bigger” ﬁrm usually establish lower marginal costs, the market
share asymmetry has also enabled it to establish a larger buﬀer (accumulated economic proﬁts)
due to the joint monopolistic pricing during the period the cartel was active. When the bigger
ﬁrm employs its predatory punishment strategy both ﬁrms incur losses. These eat away at both
ﬁrms’ buﬀers. Since the bigger ﬁrm’s buﬀer is larger it will be able to sustain these losses for
a longer period of time. Setting the predatory price for a suﬃcient amount of time eventually
3pushes the smaller ﬁrm into bankruptcy. Though the bulk of the existing literature starts
from the assumption of undiversiﬁed ﬁrms and industry symmetry, in reality this rarely holds.
The reason behind this stance is the general perception that asymmetry reduces a cartel’s
strength. Text book material on collusion implies that the coordination towards a focal price
under diﬀerentiated costs and products is more diﬃcult (see for instance Tirole (1988)). Motta
(2004) refers to asymmetry as follows: ”asymmetries between large and small ﬁrms represent
an obstacle for industry wide collusion”. In reality ﬁrms are rarely symmetrical in their cost
functions, products or market presence. Asymmetry is the rule rather than the exception.
Symmetry would imply that all colluding ﬁrms apply for leniency at the same time and this is
rarely true.
With industry asymmetry predatory pricing and the use of coercion are realistic possibilities
as the following two examples indicate. The act of predatory pricing was practiced only recently
in the Netherlands during a period of privatization of segments of the health care insurance
market. Initially private and public insurance coincided. Some ﬁrms had specialized in the ﬁrst,
others in the latter. Provision of the private type of insurance meant the insurer had to maintain
a higher solvency rate. When the public type was abolished, the solvency requirement was also
lowered. What followed was a period of ﬁerce competition. When the smoke cleared one of
the formerly public insurers claimed the formerly private insurers abused their newly acquired
buﬀers to dump insurance premiums. The matter is now under scrutiny of the Netherlands
antitrust authority (NMa).
An illustration of coercion through the threat of retaliation can be found in the leniency
application of British Petrol (BP) in the Bitumen Cartel. During its existence the colluders
managed to increase trust between its members through the design of a collective punishment
strategy. Every time a cartel member violated the cartel’s agreements the other members were
supposed to retaliate on the deviator. Among the documents, oﬀered by BP in its leniency
application, several bills were found, claiming payment for work that was never carried out.
The cartel managed to create a threat of retaliation by joining forces, using an asymmetry of
power, sustained by formal trust.
When the antitrust authority is unable to remove the credibility of retaliation the bigger
ﬁrm has the option to employ a punishment strategy on the self-reporting party. Moreover if an
antitrust authority puts too great an emphasis on leniency programs and neglects its traditional
means of prosecution the leniency program is misused and enhances trust. This is even more
likely when the threat and impact of a ﬁne by the competition authority is low, as is usually
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asymmetry the program is ineﬀective and will give rise to increased cartel strength. Policies
aimed at the removal of the threat of punishment need to be considered in order to remove
these kinds of cartels. A ﬁrst means is to install higher ﬁnes in order to remove a bigger part of
the illegal gains. Putting more emphasis on aggravating circumstances, such as coercion, in the
ﬁning guidelines can also be an eﬀective approach. Another regulatory measure is to introduce
the promise to ”protect” the reporting party after reporting in the leniency application. In
general though a leniency program cannot be fully eﬀective in its aim to prevent and prosecute
all cartels. A certain amount of eﬀort, in the sense of the traditional means of antitrust law
enforcement, will always need to be directed towards certain industries besides the leniency
program.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the related
literature. Section 3 contains a formal description of the game-theoretical model. In section 4,
we solve the model and ﬁnd sub-game perfect equilibria of the game. Finally, in section 5 the
policy implications are discussed and the analysis is concluded. In the appendix a comparative
analysis of the approach to leniency programs used in the United States and in several European
countries is provided.
2 Literature Review
The literature on applications of self-reporting schemes in antitrust starts with the paper by
Motta and Polo (2003). They conclude that the introduction of leniency programs will increase
the chance of capture of cartel. They use a game theoretical model to analyse whether a
leniency scheme is a ﬁrst best approach to combating collusive agreements. Besides this they
also take a look at the issue of reducing ﬁnes for companies that weren’t the ﬁrst to report.
Rather surprisingly their research shows, that, only when an antitrust authority is unable to
acquire suﬃcient resources, it should rely on a Leniency Program. Their main argument for
this is that it lowers the penalty and chance of getting caught of any misconduct. This seems
straightforward, but it also implies that the implementation of leniency schemes might actually
facilitate collusive behavior. It implicates that antitrust organizations should only use the law
on leniency in combination with their traditional means of investigation.
Spagnolo (2004) concludes that courageous leniency programs are closest to the optimal
ﬁne. He uses a game theoretical model to relate a ﬁrst best ”courageous” leniency scheme
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courageous program is one in which the reporting party is actually rewarded with a part of
the ﬁne paid by the other parties besides receiving amnesty. In this way a ﬁrst best solution
is established according to Spagnolo. He also gives some credit however to moderate leniency
schemes that are more like the traditional system of law enforcement.
The above argument is closely related to the more general question of the optimal structure
and design of leniency programs that has been extensively discussed in the literature. See,
for example, Spagnolo (2004), Motchenkova (2004), Motchenkova and van der Laan (2005),
or Buccorosi and Spagnolo (2001). The question of optimal design of leniency programs has
two main debatable components. They are the number of ﬁne reductions and the size of ﬁne
reductions. In the next three paragraphs we will elaborate on these issues.
Hammond (2000)1 concludes that limiting ﬁne reductions to the ﬁrst reporter will lead to a
”winner take all race dynamic” which leads to mistrust and tension among colluding partners.
How this works is not hard to imagine. Hammond uses an example of a meeting being held
by cartel members and one seat remains empty. Even though the absent member might just
be stuck in traﬃc, mistrust ensures every member is tempted to go to the antitrust authority
and report the misconduct. Intuitively one could also approach the dynamics from a diﬀerent
perspective. This is the subject of the next paragraph. It oﬀers a more formal argument for
the fact that a single ﬁne reduction, limited to the ﬁrst reporter, is more eﬀective than having
multiple reductions.
We can also argue that multiple ﬁne reductions increase trust between conspirators. A
leniency program that oﬀers a ﬁne reduction to the second (third et cetera) reporter reduces the
deterring eﬀect of the program. Suppose there are two possibilities to ﬁne reduction . Rational
behavior by all ﬁrms would lead to increased trust. The mere possibility to be exempted
from a ﬁne, without being the one that actually breaks the collusive agreement makes ﬁrms
strengthen their ties. Informal meetings or making a formal bond with the other partners will
induce the reporting party to notify its ”most favored” ally. More general the second exemption
creates an incentive to strengthen all ties between colluding partners. This can be seen as the
counterpart of antitrust (pro-trust). Though formal modeling is possible, the intuitive reasoning
is straightforward.
Moreover, a scheme based on a single ﬁne reduction ”risk dominates” multiple ﬁne reductions
programs. The majority of economic theory on collusion and leniency programs focus on the
1This paper is referred as DoJ (1993) in the literature section.
6incentive constraint of ﬁrms. The intuitive reasoning above by Hammond uses a diﬀerent angle.
The perception of risk by individuals is perhaps diﬀerent from the rational risk perception by a
ﬁrm. The possibility that there is more than one equilibrium arises, if players do not have the
same information or if one player fears the other player has limited (or other) information than
himself. 2 The question arises what the rational reaction to such a situation might be. Harsanyi
and Selten (1988) term the approach to a solution to such a situation ”risk dominance”. 3 This
notion changes the common outcome of prisoners’ dilemma. The one stage prisoners’ dilemma
is characterized by its suboptimal outcome for the players. The inﬁnitely repeated game is
characterized by the Pareto optimal outcome. Risk dominance, however allows for a more
natural perception of the players interactions. In the real world, Blonski and Spagnolo (2003)
argue, that agents do care about what would happen if other agents defected from the agreed
strategy proﬁle. In other words people try to make a perception of other players’ positions.
Even in an inﬁnitely repeated game the outcome of the prisoners’ dilemma isn’t always Pareto
optimal. The outcome eventually also depends on e.g. the discount factor. The ”race to the
courthouse” as mentioned by Hammond is an intuitive example of people’s preferences for the
risk dominant equilibrium instead of the Pareto superior equilibrium. The relationship building
as mentioned in the previous paragraph is an example of reducing the risk of the Pareto optimal
equilibrium, thus trying to overcome the risk dominant inferior equilibrium. Moving on from
these intuitive approaches to the concept of risk domination Spagnolo (2004) uses a model to
formalize the trust criterion. Two situations are compared. With an eﬀective leniency program
(i.e. ﬁne reduction is suﬃcient to aﬀect incentive constraint) the perceived risk of the collusive
outcome, with a leniency program in which only the ﬁrst reporter is eligible for a ﬁne reduction,
strictly dominates the perceived risk of a program with multiple ﬁne reductions. This result also
holds for more moderate programs in which ﬁne reductions are less eﬀective in inﬂuencing the
incentive constraint. This means that the currently applied moderate leniency program could
be made more eﬀective by limiting a ﬁne reduction to the ﬁrst ﬁrm to report. Adding more than
one possibility to a ﬁne reduction reduces the deterring eﬀect of the scheme. With ineﬀective
leniency programs (i.e. ﬁne is insuﬃcient to aﬀect incentive constraint) the perceived risk
accompanying the collusive outcome with a leniency program in which only the ﬁrst reporter is
2This is of course not applicable in case of complete information models with symmetrical ﬁrms.
3See ”A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games” by Harsanyi and Selten (1988). They describe
risk dominance as follows: ”Risk dominance tries to capture the idea that in this state of confusion the players
enter a process of expectation formation that may lead to the conclusion that in some sense one of two equilibrium
points is less risky than the other”.
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reductions.
The next point we want to address is the role of asymmetry for cartel stability. The bigger
part of the literature on leniency programs uses undiversiﬁed companies and industry symme-
try as a starting point. The main reason behind this is the general perception that asymmetry
reduces cartel strength. Leading textbooks such as Tirole (1988) state that, based on work by
e.g. Chamberlin (1929) and Scherer (1980), the coordination towards a focal price under diﬀer-
entiated costs and products is more diﬃcult. Motta and Polo (2003) argue that asymmetries
between large and small ﬁrms represent an obstacle for industry wide collusion. In reality ﬁrms
are rarely truly symmetrical in their cost functions, products or market presence. Asymmetry
is the rule rather than the exception. Symmetry would imply that all colluding ﬁrms apply for
leniency at the same time. This is rarely the case. In general though symmetry increases the
incentive to collude, but this scenario is not realistic and the introduction of a leniency program
by an antitrust authority might change the incentives for ﬁrms. Asymmetry among ﬁrms in
products, markets and cost functions is the subject of this paper.
Moreover, asymmetry in market presence reduces the incentive to self-report. An impor-
tant breach with the traditional starting point of symmetry is made by Motchenkova and van
der Laan (2004). Modeling a situation of diﬀerentiated market presence (some ﬁrms are big
others are small) and asymmetric punishment eﬀects, they show that asymmetry increases the
incentives for the bigger company to keep the collusive agreement secret from the AA. Since
the losses due to a asymmetric punishment eﬀect in competitive markets, where the bigger ﬁrm
is also present, are substantial. When the parameters of law enforcement are set incorrectly by
the AA the larger ﬁrm will attempt to keep the agreement secret. If the threshold to report is
raised however, the ﬁrm will self report and not enter into a collusive agreement afterwards. A
policy implication is to use highly lenient programs with rather cartelized economies and raise
the strictness over time. The ”leniency” in the beginning will remove the bigger part of small
ﬁrms involved in collusive agreements. This also establishes a situation where diversiﬁed ﬁrms
will ﬁnd it unattractive to start any new agreements. The existing agreements between the
latter group of ﬁrms can be broken by introducing stricter leniency programs. An illustration
of how an agreement can be kept secret is given below in section 3 of the paper, where a model
is introduced of predatory pricing as a threat to the smaller player not to report.
This research implies that asymmetry raises the question of diversiﬁcation of the application
of leniency programs. It shows that in reality there is a need for a more or less customized
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introduced in an asymmetric industry, moderate cartels are pushed into secrecy and therefore
evolve into hard core cartels is an interesting aspect. It raises the question how this increased
secrecy can be broken. Further research, which is subject of this paper, will point out how the
AA can deal with these types of cartels.
Finally, we will also touch upon the literature on predatory pricing, which represents a
possible instrument of coercion for the bigger ﬁrm by posing a threat of retaliation on smaller
ﬁrm in case of self-reporting. Predatory pricing is the practice of inducing a rival to exit a market
by setting prices below marginal cost. The practice is ﬁrst described by Bain (1949) and was
picked up later on by Milgrom and Roberts (1982). They have shown that this strategy could
be attractive for ﬁrms and, hence, has to be taken seriously by antitrust authorities. Moreover,
recent history (e.g. American Tobacco, Standard Oil) has proven this type of scheme is being
practiced in reality.
3 The Model (Formal Analysis)
We consider a set of two asymmetrical ﬁrms, which may form a cartel, taking into account the
enforcement activity of the antitrust authority. The asymmetry is related to the size of the
ﬁrms or their market shares. The antitrust authority commits to a certain enforcement policy,
which uses leniency programs. Leniency programs grant either complete or partial exemption
from ﬁnes to the ﬁrms, which reveal the existence of a cartel to the antitrust authority and come
up with suﬃcient evidence. The main innovation of this model, compared to the earlier papers
on leniency by Motta and Polo (2003) or Spagnolo (2004), is that we consider asymmetrical
ﬁrms that have diﬀerent market shares. This implies diﬀerent accumulated proﬁts during
the period of collusive pricing. Hence, unless the antitrust authority (AA) is able to remove
any asymmetry in the accumulated proﬁts (buﬀer) of each individual member of cartel, some
”bigger” members enjoy a strategic advantage. A ﬁrm with a relatively large buﬀer will be able
to employ the diﬀerence in buﬀer size as a means of coercion, such as the threat of punishment
though predatory pricing in case the rival deviates from cartel agreement by self-reporting.
Essentially, K denotes the costs of predatory pricing for the bigger ﬁrm. These costs are high
when ﬁrms are more symmetric and, vise versa, these costs are low when asymmetries are high.
The credibility and impact of this type of pricing strategy depends on the asymmetry in size
between ﬁrms, such as the diﬀerence in market shares. Market shares are denoted by β for
9”bigger” ﬁrm and by 1 − β for ”small” ﬁrm, with β > 1 − β and 0 < β < 1.
First, we describe the policy choices of the antitrust authority. Second, we describe the
timing of the game. And, ﬁnally, we specify the ﬁrms’ strategies.
Enforcement policy: The main goal of the antitrust authority is to prevent the formation
of cartels in the ﬁrst place. However, if the cartel has already been formed, the antitrust
authority aims to break the trust at the lowest possible cost. Here, following the reasoning in
section 2, we restrict the number of ﬁne reductions in case of multiple applications for leniency
to one. Only the ﬁrst reporter gets complete exemption from the ﬁne. This, as explained
above, reduces trust among cartel members. This set-up is also motivated by the fact that the
structure of leniency programs employed in US allows only for one ﬁne reduction. Moreover,
the US scheme also has a longer history than its European counterpart and has proven to be
more successful.4 Following Becker (1968), we distinguish two main parameters of enforcement
policy: penalty and probability of detection. Hence, the antitrust policy in the presence of
leniency programs can be described by the following parameters.
- The full ﬁnes F = απ, which are proportional to illegal gains for ﬁrms that were proven
guilty and have not cooperated with the antitrust authority, or are not the ﬁrst to come forward
with information about cartel.5 Here α is the coeﬃcient of proportional ﬁne. π denotes per
period illegal proﬁts from cartel formation. Competitive proﬁts (πn) are assumed to be zero for
simplicity. So that π can also be viewed as pure illegal gains. Note also that πm is maximal per
period payoﬀ for each ﬁrm in case of full collusion (i.e. when ﬁrms are able to charge monopoly
prices).
- The reduced ﬁne f speciﬁed by the US leniency program is equal to zero. 6 This set-up
allows for the most strict adherence to the leniency rules.
- The probability of law enforcement by the antitrust authority equals p ∈ (0,1]. This
variable can be thought of as an instantaneous probability that the ﬁrm is checked by antitrust
authority and found guilty. Contrary to Motta and Polo (2003), we assume that whenever the
antitrust authority checks the guilty ﬁrm, the violation is successfully discovered. Moreover, we
assume that p is determined by e.g. an exogenous budget of the antitrust authority ﬁnanced by
the government that can be used to promote enforcement, so that p reﬂects the costs of eﬀorts
4See historical overview and overview of structures of leniency programs in Appendix.
5The motivation for this type of structure and example of application of proportional penalty schemes in
competition law enforcement was studied in Motchenkova and Kort (2006).
6See also Appendix.
10of antitrust authority put into law enforcement activities.
Timing of the game:
Two asymmetrical ﬁrms play the two stage game in the presence of antitrust law enforcement
which incorporates leniency programs.
At time t = 0 the antitrust authority sets parameters of the enforcement policy: F = απ and
p and parameters of the leniency program (which allows for only one ﬁne reduction and reduced
ﬁne f equals 0). So, self-reporting becomes an attractive option at this stage. Prior to this stage
t < 0 ﬁrms may decide to form a collusive agreement. As conventional analysis of supergames
(see Tirole (1988)) implies, in the absence of the antitrust enforcement, collusion can arise in
equilibrium only when the discount factor is large enough, namely, δ ≥ πm
2πm−πn = δc.7 So, for
further analysis we will direct our attention to the values of the discount factor δ ≥ δc, which
ensures that cartels are stable in the absence of antitrust enforcement and, hence, the ﬁrst stage
of the ”revelation-retaliation” game is reached.
Next, the game between the two asymmetrical ﬁrms is played. At time t = 1 (stage 1 of
the game) the small ﬁrm moves. 8 It can choose between two actions: self-report or keep cartel
secret.
Further, at time t = 2 (stage 2 of the game) the big ﬁrm responds to the action of the
small by choosing whether to punish the small ﬁrm (through predatory pricing) for reporting
the cartel or to abstain from punishment.
Note that the antitrust authority does not take an active part in the game. It only sets
policy parameters, F, f , p, α, and the rules of leniency programs. This complies with the
currently ”one size ﬁts all” setting of the antitrust policy parameters.
Payoﬀs of both players in each of the four possible cases are described in the following
subsection. Each time we refer with ”Small” to the smaller ﬁrm and with ”Big” to the other
player.
7In the absence of any antitrust enforcement, i.e. when neither ﬁnes nor rate of law enforcement can be used,
collusion can be sustained only when the short run gain from an unilateral deviation from collusive agreement
by undercutting in prices together with competitive proﬁts thereafter is smaller than the payoﬀ from sustaining
collusive strategy forever:
πm
1−δ > 2πm +
δπn
1−δ for i = 1,2. Hence, δ ≥
πm
2πm−πn = δc. Note also that with
competitive proﬁts normalized to 0, we have δc =
1
2.
8We assume here that incentives for the bigger ﬁrm to keep the cartel secret are always higher since it gets
higher expected gains from continuation. So, the big ﬁrm would either need stronger incentives or will self-report
only later in time than the small ﬁrm.
11Strategies and Payoﬀs:
1. Small has decided to report and Big responds by setting a predatory price: Big receives
its current share βπm of collusive proﬁts and the monopoly proﬁts forever after ( i.e. πm( δ
1−δ)).
But it has to overcome a loss of size K (due to pricing below marginal cost) and a ﬁne of size
αβπm and there is the risk of a ﬁne when setting a predatory price of pαπm( δ
1−δ). The latter
is the expected ﬁne Big might be granted, because of the abuse of its dominant position. Small
receives its current share (1−β)πm but looses its sunk cost S, since it has to leave the market.
Small cooperated with the antitrust authority, so it is exempted from a ﬁne.
2. Small has decided to self-report and Big decides not to retaliate and simply moves to
marginal costs pricing (competitive equilibrium) 9 : Big receives its current share of collusive
proﬁts βπm and is ﬁned αβπm. Small receives its current share (1 − β)πm , but doesn’t make
any economic proﬁt forever after. Since it reported to the antitrust authority it isn’t ﬁned.
3. Small has decided not to report and Big is inclined to set predatory prices. This means
that predatory pricing was attractive strategy already before the antitrust enforcement and
leniency programs were introduced (t=0). We will rule out this possibility later on when
we discuss the solution of the game (it just imposes additional constraint on discount factor
(δ ≤ δ∗∗, see section below). In this case Big receives its current share of monopoly proﬁts βπm
less a loss due to the predatory pricing (K) , but after small leaves it will receive the entire
(discounted) monopoly proﬁt forever after πm( δ
1−δ), though it also faces a risk of capture during
the transition stage over its share of proﬁts pαβπm and there is the chance of a ﬁne pαπm( δ
1−δ)
during the monopoly price setting due to its misconduct (in the form of abuse of dominant
position). Small receives its current share (1 − β)πm but looses its sunk cost S. Since the ﬁrm
is bankrupt the authorities cannot levy a ﬁne on the ﬁrm for its misconduct.
4. Small has decided not to report and Big is inclined to continue the collusive price setting:
Big receives its share of collusive proﬁts forever βπm( 1
1−δ) but faces the risk of being ﬁned
pαβπm( 1
1−δ). Similarly, Small receives its current share forever (1 − β)πm( 1
1−δ) but faces the
risk of prosecution pα(1 − β)πm( 1
1−δ).
It should be stressed that for any t > 2 , decisions of both players do not change and
payoﬀs obtained at t = 2 will be discounted. This is due to the fact that the coeﬃcient of the
proportional penalty and the rate of law enforcement are ﬁxed and, hence, the environment
9We assume here that in case one of the ﬁrms self-reported, trust will be broken forever and ﬁrms will not go
back to collusion anymore.
12does not change. Moreover, we assume that in case of self-reporting trust is broken and ﬁrms do
not go back to collusion ever again. Therefore, outcomes (1) and (2) are stable by assumption.
We summarize the above description of the game as follows:
Stage 0: The Antitrust Authority announces the parameters of the penalty scheme: p and
F, and the parameters of leniency program: f = 0 and the number of ﬁne reductions.
Stage 1: The smaller ﬁrm decide whether to reveal information about the existence of the
cartel to the antitrust authority or not (once and for all decision).
Stage 2: The bigger ﬁrm observes the decision of the smaller ﬁrm and decides whether to
punish it for self-reporting or not (once and for all decision).
If no self-reporting is chosen by the smaller ﬁrm and the bigger ﬁrm decides to continue
collusion, then the repeated game, between authority and ﬁrms, where authority can discover
violation with probability p in each period, is played till inﬁnity (under assumption that even
in case violation is discovered by antitrust authority, ﬁrms go back to collusion).10
The discount factor is denoted by δ = 1
1+r, where r is the interest rate. The game tree and
players’ payoﬀs are summarized in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 about here]
We now proceed to establish the subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage game, which
is described in Figure 1, played by both ﬁrms once the policy parameters are set.
4 Solution of the Game
To ﬁnd the subgame perfect equilibria of the game we employ backward induction. First we
consider the decision of the bigger ﬁrm which is taken in stage 2, and next the decision of the
smaller ﬁrm which is taken in stage 1. Three diﬀerent parts of the game in Figure 1 can be
distinguished as sub-games. First, Small has a choice whether to report or not. It will base
its decision on the reaction to its choice it expects from the bigger player. Therefore Big faces
two games. If Small has reported their common illegal conduct, Big has to decide whether to
predate or not to predate on its former partner. In the literature not predating is often referred
to as a punishment strategy. Big sets its price equal to marginal or variable costs so that small
is “punished” for reporting to the antitrust authority. Predatory pricing however seems like a
bigger punishment for Small. It’s being driven out of the market! If Small decides not to report,
10Similar assumption is employed in Motta and Polo (2003).
13Big faces the same decision. Setting a price according to a predatory scheme or (in this case)
not to predate and therefore continue the collusive agreement. Clearly Small’s initial action
depends on the Big’s reaction. Since it knows Big’s position and is aware of the value of all
other parameters (e.g. law enforcement and discount value) it will choose to play accordingly.
4.1 Collusion is the preferred strategy before leniency is introduced
We start by considering the choice of the bigger ﬁrm between predatory pricing and collusion
(i.e. by comparing outcomes (3) and (4) described in previous section). Note that if outcome
(4) is preferred over outcome (3) by the bigger ﬁrm, collusion is also the preferred strategy
before leniency is introduced (under traditional antitrust enforcement). This happens when
βπm( 1
1−δ)−pαβπm( 1
1−δ) > βπm−K +πm( δ
1−δ)−pαβπm−pαπm( δ
1−δ). This inequality implies
that predatory pricing is more attractive than collusion for the bigger ﬁrm in both situations
(with or without the availability of a leniency program) when the discount factor is greater
than the following threshold:
δ >
K
K + πm(1 − β)(1 − pα)
= δ∗∗(K,p,α). (1)
So, for any values of the discount rate above the threshold δ∗∗, there is no collusion before
the leniency program is introduced and the game doesn’t apply. In the remainder of this chapter
all values of the discount rate over threshold δ∗∗ are regarded as values for the parameter δ, in
which equilibrium (3) (no self-reporting, predatory pricing) arises. This equilibrium isn’t of any
interest to answering the questions posed above and will therefore be left out of the analysis.
Expression (1) gives us the ﬁrst incentive compatibility constraint. It is represented in
Figures 2 and 3 by the line δ∗∗, which plots δ(K) as a function of K in the (δ,K) − plane. In
addition, as discussed above, comparative statics of the behavior of δ∗∗(K,p,α) with respect to
the main parameters of the model shows that
∂δ∗∗(K,p,α)
∂K
> 0 if pα < 1 or
∂δ∗∗(K,p,α)
∂K








These inequalities mean that the likelihood of collusion is increased further when higher
values of p and α apply before the introduction of the leniency program. The ﬁrst derivatives
of δ∗∗ with respect to K, p and α are positive when pα < 1 (i.e. in the setting with low
expected penalty). Meaning that raising either of these parameters will increase the height of
this threshold, thus increasing the likelihood of the situation in which collusion is sustainable.
14Intuitively this makes sense, since predatory pricing is also illegal and increasing K implies
more symmetry. This complies with general theory on collusion and symmetry (see Motta and
Polo (2003)).
Finally, in order to ensure consistent behavior (meaning that collusion is sustainable and
there are no incentives to predate in the absence of the possibility of self-reporting and subse-
quent clemency) we will consider only interval δc < δ < δ∗∗, so that outcome (3) is ruled out
and collusion is sustainable before the revelation game starts.
Recall from section 3 that δc = πm
2πm−πn. Hence, normalizing πn = 0, we get that δc = 1
2.
Taking into account (1), this implies that interval [δc,δ∗∗] is not empty when δ∗∗ > 1
2, i.e.
when K > πm(1−β)(1−pα) with pα < 1 or when K > |πm(1 − β)(1 − pα)| with pα > 1. This
implies that the issue we are considering becomes especially sharp in industries characterized
by relatively low asymmetry (i.e. where K is high).
4.2 Determination of other thresholds for equilibrium intervals
Big’s choice between predatory pricing and marginal cost pricing is based on a comparison of
the outcomes (1) and (2). The outcome (2) in the model is the situation in which strategies
(report, not predate) are used by the smaller ﬁrm and the bigger ﬁrm respectively. Outcome (1)
in the model is the situation in which strategies (report, predate) are used. Big is not inclined
to predate in case of reporting by Small when Big considers its payoﬀ in equilibrium (2) to be
higher than its payoﬀ in equilibrium (1). The condition for equilibrium (report, not predate)
to arise holds when the following inequality is satisﬁed: βπm −αβπm > βπm −K +πm( δ
1−δ)−
αβπm −pαπm( δ
1−δ). This inequality implies that competitive pricing is more attractive for the
bigger ﬁrm than predatory pricing after the smaller ﬁrm applied for leniency if the discount
factor is less than the following threshold:
δ <
K
K + πm(1 − pα)
= δ∗(K,p,α). (3)
Diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to K implies that
∂δ∗(K,p,α)
∂K
> 0 if pα < 1 (4)
This implies that when pα < 1 (i.e. expected penalty is low) the equilibrium (2) is less
likely to occur the smaller the size of K. Recall that K is the size of the buﬀer of Small, since it
equals the cost of e.g. driving the smaller ﬁrm out of the market. After Small looses its buﬀer
15it can’t sustain the losses associated with the predatory price setting. Intuitively this means
that the greater the size diﬀerence (asymmetry), the lower K and therefore threshold δ∗ will
be lower when asymmetry is greater. It also implies that raising the risk of being ﬁned will
increase δ∗. Intuitively it means that the smaller the asymmetry and the higher the chance of a
capture and substantial ﬁne, the more likely the perceived discount rate is below the threshold
δ∗.
Next, we move to stage 1 and consider the decision of the smaller ﬁrm given no predatory
pricing is chosen by Big in the second stage of the game. Outcome (2) is preferred over
outcome (4) by Small if the following inequality is satisﬁed: (1 − β)πm > (1 − β)πm( 1
1−δ) −
pα(1−β)πm( 1
1−δ). This inequality implies that self-reporting is more attractive for Small when
the discount factor is lower than the following threshold:
δ < pα = δ∗∗∗(K,p,α). (5)
This is a clear indication that raising the rate of capture and the proportional ﬁne will
make the smaller ﬁrm to choose equilibrium (2) over the payoﬀ from equilibrium (4), and will
therefore decide to self-report instead of continuing to collude.
Finally, we also have to compare the payoﬀs for Small in case outcome (1) arises and in case
outcome (4) arises. Equilibrium (1) in the model is the situation in which strategies (report,
predate) are employed by the smaller ﬁrm and the bigger ﬁrm respectively. Equilibrium (4)
in the model is the situation in which strategies (not report, not predate) are used. Now the
smaller player is confronted with a choice between being predated on by Big (and the associated
loss of its sunk cost) or going along with Big in the collusive price setting. The latter implies
that Small prefers to choose a strategy leading to the collusive price setting over a strategy
leading to bankruptcy. This occurs when the payoﬀ of equilibrium (4) is higher than the payoﬀ
in equilibrium (1) for Small. I.e. the following inequality is satisﬁed: (1 − β)πm( 1
1−δ) − pα(1 −
β)πm( 1
1−δ) > (1 − β)πm − S. This inequality implies that collusion is more attractive for the
small ﬁrm if discount factor is higher than the following threshold:
δ >
(1 − β)πmpα − S
(1 − β)πm − S
= δ∗∗∗∗(K,S,p,α). (6)
Closer analysis of expressions (6) and (5) shows the following regularities:






(1−β)πm<S . In this case we have also that δ∗∗∗∗ > 1.






(1−β)πm>S . In this case we have also that δ∗∗∗∗ < 1.
164.3 Derivation of Equilibrium Solutions
Next, once we have determined all the thresholds in terms of the discount factor, we can move to
the description of equilibrium outcomes for each possible combination of the parameter values.
Firstly, two cases need to be distinguished: when pα > 1 and when pα < 1. Inequality
pα > 1 corresponds to the case when the expected penalty is already high enough to prevent
any misconduct (in a static setting) in the absence of leniency programs. The other inequality
corresponds to the situation when traditional antitrust enforcement is not strong enough.
We start our analysis with the discussion of a suﬃciently high penalty (the case where
pα > 1). In this setting two subcases depending on the size of δ∗∗∗∗(K,S,p,α) can arise. When
n
pα>1
(1−β)πm>S we obtain that δ∗∗∗∗ > 1, and the distribution of outcomes can be described as is
done in the left hand side of Figure 2. When
n
pα>1
(1−β)πm<S we obtain that δ∗∗∗∗ < 1. Hence, the
distribution of outcomes is given by the right hand side of Figure 2.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 presents the locuses δ∗,δ∗∗,δ∗∗∗, and δ∗∗∗∗ (derived in previous subsection and given
by (3), (1), (5), and (6) respectively) in (K,δ)−space . The left panel of Figure 2 implies that,
in industries with low sunk costs and relatively strong antitrust enforcement, depending on the
degree of asymmetry the following three outcomes can arise. When there is high asymmetry
(i.e. K < |πm(1 − β)(1 − pα)|), outcome (3) will arise in equilibrium.11 This means that in
this industry predatory pricing is the most attractive strategy even before a leniency program
is introduced. With an intermediate degree of asymmetry (i.e. |πm(1 − β)(1 − pα)| < K <
|πm(1 − pα)|), outcome (1) arises in equilibrium.12 In this case Big (strong) ﬁrm will choose
to retaliate on a smaller ﬁrm after the latter chooses to self-report. This is the outcome the
antitrust authority wants to avoid. In these types of industries a greater emphasis needs to be
put on the protection part of a leniency program. Perhaps through stricter monitoring after
a ﬁrm reported to the AA. Finally, when there are low asymmetries (i.e. K > |πm(1 − pα)|),
outcome (2) will arise in equilibrium.13 This implies that with high penalties in the industries
11Proof: since δ
∗∗ < 0 and δ
∗ < 0 , any δ in the interval (0,1) is higher than δ
∗∗ → (3) is played in equilibrium.
12Proof: since δ
∗∗ > 1 and δ
∗ < 0 , any δ < δ
∗∗ and any δ > δ
∗. This in turn implies that outcome (4) is
preferred over (3) by Big in case Small chooses not to self-report and outcome (1) is preferred over (2) by Big in
case Small chooses to reveal information. Next, since any δ < δ
∗∗∗∗ , when δ
∗∗∗∗ > 1, taking into account best
response of Big, Small will prefer outcome (1) over (4). Hence, (1) is played in equilibrium.
13Proof: since δ
∗∗ > 1 and δ
∗ > 1 , any δ < δ
∗∗ and any δ < δ
∗. This in turn implies that outcome (4) is
preferred over (3) by Big in case Small chooses not to self-report and outcome (2) is preferred over (1) by Big
17with high K (or low asymmetries) there is no danger of retaliation or collusion. The ﬁrst best
outcome with self-reporting and competitive pricing afterwards arises. In this setting leniency
programs appear to be eﬀective.
The right panel of Figure 2 represents the results of the analysis for industries with relatively
high sunk costs and relatively strong antitrust enforcement. Here, again depending on the
degree of asymmetry between ﬁrms, the following outcomes can arise. When there are high
asymmetries (i.e. K < |πm(1 − β)(1 − pα)|), outcome (3) will arise in equilibrium. When
there are low asymmetries (i.e. K > |πm(1 − pα)|), outcome (2) arises in equilibrium. For an
intermediate level of asymmetry both outcome (1) and outcome (4) can arise in equilibrium.
So in addition to the possibility of retaliation, there is a small danger of collusion, when sunk
costs for small ﬁrm are too high. This result is quite intuitive, since with high sunk costs the
threat of a possible retaliation can force small ﬁrm to keep the cartel secret and not to apply
for leniency.
To summarize the above discussion it needs to be stressed that, even when penalties are
high enough to block the cartel formation, (i.e. pα > 1) there could be adverse eﬀects of
leniency programs on the incentives to the ﬁrms to break the cartel. There could be a threat
of retaliation and of even stronger collusion in the industries with an intermediate level of
asymmetry (i.e. |πm(1 − β)(1 − pα)| < K < |πm(1 − pα)|). This implies that, in this kind of
industries, a strong emphasis on the protection of leniency applicants needs to be introduced
and particular attention should be payed to industries where sunk costs are high.
Next, we continue our analysis with the discussion of the case where pα < 1. In this setting




obtain that δ∗∗∗∗ > 1, and, hence, the distribution of outcomes can be described as is done
in the left panel of Figure 3. When
n
pα>1
(1−β)πm>S we obtain that δ∗∗∗∗ < 1, and, hence, the
distribution of outcomes is given in the right panel of Figure 3.
[Figure 3 about here]
In the case where pα < 1 the following regularities are satisﬁed for any parameter values:
δ∗∗∗ = pα < 1, δ∗ > 0, δ∗∗ > 0, δ∗∗ > δ∗ . Note also that when
n
pα>1
(1−β)πm>S and δ∗∗∗∗ < 1, we
have that δ∗∗∗∗ − δ∗∗∗ =
S(pα−1)
(1−β)πm−S < 0. Hence, δ∗∗∗∗ < δ∗∗∗ for any parameter values. This is
in case Small chooses to reveal information about the cartel. Next, since any δ < δ
∗∗∗ , when δ
∗∗∗ = pα > 1,
taking into account the best response of Big, the smaller ﬁrm will prefer outcome (2) over (4). Hence, (2) is
played in equilibrium.
18also depicted in the right panel of Figure 3. Moreover, in both cases described above (namely
δ∗∗∗∗ < 1 and δ∗∗∗∗ > 1,with pα < 1) , we have that δ∗∗ − δ∗∗∗ > 0, when K > pαπm(1 − β)
(denoted by K1 in Figure 3) and δ∗−δ∗∗∗ > 0, when K > pαπm (denoted by K2 in Figure 3).14
Finally, based on the above analysis, we conclude that the following proposition holds. It
relates four industry types to an environment with rather weak law enforcement (the product of
the rate of capture and the coeﬃcient of proportional ﬁne is smaller than one). This situation
applies to most European countries and to EU antitrust law as well. Though a comparison
between US antitrust law and its European counterpart is hazardous, the US system seems to
be more strict. Especially when considering it only grants a single ﬁne reduction for the ﬁrst to
self-report. For a more detailed insight into these matters see the appendix. Having established
that the environmental condition of the above proposition holds we can move on to the industry
characteristics and complement these statements with policy implications.
Proposition 1 When traditional antitrust enforcement is weak. (pα < 1):
Proposition 1 (1). In industries with little asymmetry (K is high) and low discount rate the
ﬁrst best outcome with self-reporting and competitive pricing afterwards (equilibrium (2)) can
be achieved.
The aim of the leniency program to establish competition in cartelized industries is only
achieved when ﬁrms within an industry are more or less of the same size and little emphasis is
put on future proﬁts. This result is counterintuitive to the reasoning where symmetry creates a
common focal price and facilitates collusion. Clearly asymmetry can be an important aspect for
the stability of cartels. By far the largest number of industries can be described along the above
lines. The ﬁrms within these industries have a strong incentive to start competing healthily,
deviate from collusion or report to the AA upon introduction of the program. A new question
that can be raised is whether collusion in these types of industries is as harmful to society as
collusion is in industries characterized by a higher discount rate.
Proposition 1 (2). In industries characterized by a high discount rate. (δ > δ∗∗) predatory
pricing is always the most attractive strategy for any type of ﬁrm (regardless of asymmetry).
Outcome (3) arises in equilibrium
Industries that do put an emphasis on future proﬁts will have a reason to do so. Mostly
these industries are comprised of rather larger ﬁrms than in the previously mentioned type of
14Proofs of these simple regularities are available from authors upon request.
19industry. Natural monopolists are willing to make great investments in networks since they
know they will be able to proﬁt from these for many years. The introduction of a leniency
program has no eﬀect what so ever in this type of industry since there is usually only a single
ﬁrm active in the market. In other words there is no collusion in the ﬁrst place. The prevention
and regulation of monopolists lies beyond the scope of this paper.
Proposition 1 (3). In industries with low sunk costs (S < (1 − β)πm), high asymmetry
(K < pαπm(1−β)), and a low discount rate there is a threat of retaliation on the self-reporting
ﬁrm. Outcome (1) with self-reporting and predatory pricing arises in equilibrium.
In industries with high sunk costs (S > (1−β)πm) the threat of retaliation is much stronger
than in industries with low sunk costs. Outcome (1) can arise for a wider range of combinations
of K and δ. See left panel of Figure 3.
The advent of ﬁerce competition isn’t always an illustration of ”healthy” competition (where
healthy refers to pricing at or slightly above marginal cost). A war on prices or a period of
repetitive advertising on prices might be an indication of dumping or predatory pricing. These
practices reduces welfare, since investments are wasted through the destruction of capital. More-
over the consequence of predatory pricing is the exit of ﬁrms from the industry and healthy
competition is further away than it ever was. The introduction of a leniency program in a
cartelized industries leads, regardless of industry asymmetry and ﬁrm preference for current or
future proﬁts, to predatory pricing and a loss of welfare. Besides the welfare loss the antitrust
authority will also have to spend resources in the future to regulate the newly created monop-
olists. This scenario is especially likely to occur in asymmetrical industries with a relatively
high degree of sunk cost and a greater emphasis on future proﬁts. It is the promise to protect
any party to self-report to the antitrust authority that helps to overcome this scenario. This
promise needs to be clear and credible, though resources need not be wasted. Therefore a
promise to protect should be incorporated in the leniency guidelines.
Proposition 1 (4). In industries with low sunk costs (S < (1 − β)πm), little asymmetry (K
is high), and a high discount rate collusion (equilibrium (4)) is sustainable even after leniency
programs are introduced.
The worst eﬀect the introduction of a leniency program can have is the strengthening the
stability of cartels. The results of the analysis show this does occur however. In industries
characterized by little asymmetry and an intermediate to high emphasis on future proﬁts this
scenario is more likely to occur, especially when sunk costs are low. The reason the stability
20of the cartel is increased lies in the possibility for large ﬁrms to use the leniency program as a
means to increase the trust they put in other ﬁrms not to report to the AA. The larger ﬁrm
”trusts” the smaller not to report to the AA. It can do so since the smaller ﬁrm knows the
punishment of the larger ﬁrm is severe. This scenario can never be prevented completely. The
chance, this scenario develops however, can be lowered by developing a comparable promise to
protect the reporting ﬁrm as is described in the previous paragraph. Besides this type of policy
approach the leniency programme should always go accompanied by an eﬀort of traditional
antitrust law enforcement directly aimed at the industries described above. When the threat
of a ﬁne due to the more traditional prosecution increases, more ﬁrms will choose to abandon
the cartel.
5 Conclusions
Upon the introduction of leniency programs to antitrust law enforcement a body of literature
has started to develop. Some researches (see Motta and Polo (2003) have pointed out that this
type of policy approach should only be considered when an AA has a lack of resources. This
argument is based on the fact that (the current application of) leniency programs lowers the
penalty and chance of getting caught to those that misbehave. Further research by Spagnolo
(2004) has shown that in order to move closer to an optimal ﬁne the leniency program should
actually be able to provide a reward to those that self-report. Another means to make use of
ﬁrms’ strategic risk considerations is to limit the number of ﬁne reductions to the ﬁrst ﬁrm
to report. The analysis in this paper adds to the current economic literature on leniency
programs in the application of law enforcement of cartels and illegal price-ﬁxing activities, but
the reasoning can also be applied to corporate whistle-blowing programs and witness protection
programs. It reveals a number of adverse eﬀects of the introduction of leniency programs in view
of industry asymmetry. The main conclusion is that the introduction of a leniency program,
regardless of the size of the ﬁne, facilitates the stability of cartels in certain industries. This
is mainly due to a leniency program’s inability to remove the threat of punishment on a self-
reporter (or whistle-blower) by its former partners. After a ﬁrm is convicted it remains with
suﬃcient resources to retaliate on the reporting party. The type of punishment used in the
model is predatory pricing. It is however the mere threat of (any type of) punishment that
enables some ﬁrms to use coercion as a means to increase trust in the cartel. Though the
removal of trust is the aim of the program, the introduction of the scheme actually provides
21colluding ﬁrms of a means to stabilize the cartel.
Increasing the size of the ﬁne and limiting the number of ﬁne reductions to the ﬁrst party to
report isn’t suﬃcient to (fully) overcome the adverse eﬀect of the introduction of the leniency
program. The analysis in this paper implies that the program’s eﬀectiveness largely depends
on the environment and the type of industry to which it is being applied. Raising the rate
of capture (through e.g. limiting the number of ﬁne reductions) and the size of the penalty
do help to diminish the adverse eﬀect. The size of the ﬁne can for instance be increased by
putting a greater emphasis on aggravating circumstances, such as coercion. It will however not
be suﬃcient to tackle cartels in industries with an intermediate level of asymmetry. When an
AA is unable to raise suﬃcient resources to increase the rate of capture through traditional
law enforcement, in this type of industry it should direct its focus on the promise to protect
self-reporters from retaliation by former collusive partners. Since the current type of policy
approach is suﬃciently eﬀective in a great number of industries, diversiﬁcation of the program
can give rise to a more eﬃcient use of resources. Customization of the program, where it comes
to protection, size and number of the ﬁne reduction, paralleled by a traditional eﬀort of law
enforcement aimed at industries in which the adverse eﬀect in likely to occur will help to make
the program more eﬀective.
The analysis of section 4 implies that even when penalties are high enough to block cartel
formation (i.e. the product of rate of capture and coeﬃcient of proportional ﬁne is greater than
one) there could be adverse eﬀects of leniency programs on the incentives of the ﬁrms to break
cartel. There is a threat of retaliation and even of stronger collusion in the industries charac-
terized by an intermediate degree of asymmetry. This implies that in this kind of industries
strong self-reporter’s protection program should be introduced and particular attention should
be paid to the industries where sunk costs are high (high barriers to entry).
When the product of rate of capture and coeﬃcient of proportional ﬁne is lower than one,
(which is currently generally the case for European countries), the eﬀectiveness of leniency
programs largely depends on the environment and on the type of the industry. In this case
the focus of competition authority should be on those industries characterized by a low to
intermediate degree of asymmetry and an intermediate to high discount rate. In this type
of industry, regardless of any barriers to entry, chances are that, the introduction of a mild
leniency program facilitates collusion. It serves to strengthen trust between colluders, rather
than a breach of trust.
Another eﬀect of the introduction of a leniency program is predatory pricing. Though this
22might at ﬁrst look like healthy competition it eventually reduces welfare. In an environment
of high ﬁnes (product is greater than one) this is a more likely scenario and it will occur in
industries characterized by an intermediate level of asymmetry and low barriers to entry. How-
ever also in an environment of low ﬁnes predatory pricing can be the eﬀect of the introduction
of the program, especially when barriers to entry are substantial. Besides having to spend re-
sources on regulating these new (semi) monopolists, the destruction of capital associated with
the predatory price setting is detrimental to welfare.
To summarize the above analysis, in industries characterized by barriers to entry (such
as sunk cost) and degree of asymmetry leniency programs may be ineﬀective and give rise to
increased cartel strength or cause exit of weaker rivals due to retaliation by stronger ﬁrms.
Policies aimed at the removal of the threat of punishment through predatory pricing need to
be considered in order to remove these kinds of hard core cartels. A ﬁrst means is to employ
higher ﬁnes in order to remove a bigger part of the illegal gains. Putting more emphasis on
aggravating circumstances, such as coercion, in the ﬁning guidelines can also be an eﬀective
approach. Another regulatory measure is to introduce the promise to ”protect” the reporting
party after reporting in the leniency application. In general though a leniency program can not
be fully eﬀective in its aim to prevent and prosecute all cartels. A certain amount of eﬀort will
always need to be directed towards certain industries beside the leniency program.
6 Appendix: Historical Overview and Structure of LPs
Table 1: Timing of introduction of competition law and Leniency Programs
General Competition Law Leniency Program
Country First initiative Organization in charge LP introduction LP latest revision
EU 1959 Commission 1996 2002
US 1890 DoJ 1978 1997
UK 1998 Oﬃce of Fair Trading 1998 2004
Netherlands 1998 Nma 2002 2006
Germany 1958 Bundeskartellamt 2002 2006
23Table 2: Fining Systems and structure of Leniency Programs
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Figure 1: Game tree and players’ payoﬀs.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium outcomes when pα > 1.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium outcomes when pα < 1.
29